

Production Grid Infrastructure WG

PGI Security Considerations

Thoughts about common security profiles

Morris Riedel (FZJ – Jülich Supercomputing Centre & DEISA)


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Outline




Outline




- OGF PGI 101
- 3 ,Plumbings‘ for Authentication
- 2 ,Plumbings for Attribute-based Authorization
- Common attributes
- Common constraints/restrictions
- Out of Scope
- Discussions
- Conclusions

OGF PGI 101



OGSA Standards



Job submission interface
& protocol standards

Service level
agreements standard

Job description
language standards

Co-allocation
standards



Storage access & data
transfer standards

Information semantics
standards

Self-management
standards

Security setup standards



Standard N+1

Standard N+2

Standard N+3

Standard N+3

Standard N+4


Standard N+5

Standard N+6



Standard N+7




GIN Production Experience



PGI Approach (1)



PGI Approach (2)



Scope



- Identified Basic Use Case
- Only matured specifications
- Specification adoption exist in production middleware systems
- Experience exists in production infrastructures
- Interoperability tests have been performed
- Real scientific use cases require these standards
- Refinements necessary and not complete spec. re-definitions

→ 'Low hanging fruits'

Compare History of Computer Science



ISO / OSI 7 Layer Model



Internet 4 Layer Model

Standardized Generalized Markup
Language (SGML)




Extensible Markup Language
(XML)

Open Grid Services Architecture
(OGSA)



Production Grid
Infrastructure Standard

PGI Ecosystem Overview




Plumbings Idea




- Plumbings can be used to put different ,elements‘ through
 - E.g. warm water (realizing normal OpenSSL-TLS connections) vs. Cold water (realizing GSI connections)
- Many plumbings can be installed in parallel – while not crossing the other plumbings
 - E.g. modern container concepts allow easily addition of n handler that can take care of the elements by n plumbings
- Different plumbings can use the same source and can be sink into the same achievement/functionality
 - E.g. Attribute-based VOMS system vs. SAML-based VOMS system
 - Both based on same VO DBs but convey attributes differently
 - However, authZ decision based on these attributes can be again usable for both approaches (e.g. one XACML policy file)
- Plumbings may be removed over time while new plumbings are already deployed in infrastructures

Missing Links & Refinements



3 Plumbings for Authentication




TLS with GSI Proxies



- GSI-based TLS is not compatible with OpenSSL TLS
 - Fixed with Globus Version 4 (*probably should be mentioned like this: It is possible to make GSI-based TLS be compatible with OpenSSL TLS, since even in GT4 (or later version), you still need to setup an environment variable to switch on compatible TLS*)
 - (a full end-entity X.509 certificate can't be used with this and fails) (*a full end-entity X.509 certificate actually can be used for GSI-based TLS, at least if the private key is not protected by passphrase, according to practice*) - but GSI libraries are required?!
- However, many production systems require still the GSI-based TLS
 - Proxies needed since the data staging might be delegated
 - For instance, current implementations of the SRM interface (same Web Service Level as Basic Execution Services)
 - Numerous GridFTP implementations

TLS with GSI Proxies




TLS with OpenSSL Proxies



- Service Container of NAREGI, ARC & gLite (CREAM-BES) require OpenSSL-based Proxies TLS Connections
 - Proxies because a job submit might be delegated
 - Service container could work with non TLS proxies
 - Implies proxy chain checking
- UNICORE can work with OpenSSL-based Proxies
 - Implements optionally the proxy chain checking for these security setups
 - Proxies not needed for delegation – but used for interoperability

TLS with OpenSSL Proxies




TLS with Full Certificates



- Service Container of UNICORE require TLS connections using full end-entity certificates
 - Service container could not work with proxies in this setup
 - proxy chain checking is not required!

TLS with Full Certificates



Message layer Authentication



- WS-Security Specifications
 - UsernameToken profile
 - X.509 Token profile (Can be directly generated if a X.509 credential is possessed)
 - SAML Token profile
 - A third-party authority is required to issue SAML Token
 - Should be considered together with the SAML attribute assertion used for AuthZ. SAML Token includes <saml:Subject> and <saml:Attribute> (see Web Services Security:SAML Token Profile V1.0)
 - The VOMS SAML Service can be enhanced to support this profile


```
<saml:Assertion
  <saml:AttributeStatement>
    <saml:Subject>
      <saml:NameIdentifier NameQualifier="www.example.com" Format="...">
uid=joe,ou=people,ou=saml-demo,o=grid.org
      </saml:NameIdentifier>
      <saml:SubjectConfirmation>
        <saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:holder-of-key
        </saml:ConfirmationMethod>
        <ds:KeyInfo>
          <ds:KeyValue>...</ds:KeyValue>
        </ds:KeyInfo>
      </saml:SubjectConfirmation>
    </saml:Subject>
    <saml:Attribute AttributeName="MemberLevel"
AttributeNamespace="http://www.oasis.open.org/Catalyst2002/attributes">
      <saml:AttributeValue>gold</saml:AttributeValue>
    </saml:Attribute>
  </saml:AttributeStatement>
  <ds:Signature>...</ds:Signature>
</saml:Assertion>
```

Message layer Authentication



- WS-Trust
 - Define primitives and extensions for security token exchange
 - Enable the issuance and dissemination of credentials within different trust domains
 - Can be used for defining the token exchange: e.g. getting SAML Token by providing X.509 Token, etc.

2 Plumings for AuthZ




AC Certificates in Extensions



- Supporting legacy VOMS exposing ACs
- AC can be combined transported with any option used for AUTHENTICATION (*? should not the AC be transported through Proxy certificate's extension, and proxy is the only option for authentication in this case?*)

AC Certificates in Extension




SAML Assertions in SOAP Header



- Supporting SAML-based VOMS exposing SAML assertions
- SAML assertions can be combined transported with any option used for AUTHENTICATION (*?What are the options? SAML token (SAML attributes are inside SAML token) for SOAP message layer authentication; and Proxy certificate (SAML attributes are as proxy extension) for transport layer authentication?*)

SAML Assertion in SOAP Header




Two profiles for attribute based AuthZ




- a. Attribute Certificate (AC) --- VOMS mechanism
 - Proxy certificate for transport layer authentication
 - AC carried by proxy certificate
 - Third-party authority needed for AC issuing
- b. SAML assertion
 - SAML Token for message (SOAP) layer authentication
 - SAML attribute assertion carried by SAML Token
 - Third-party authority needed for SAML assertion issuing
 - Different from 'a', if message layer authentication needs to be achieved, the SAML assertion should include <saml:Subject/> for subject confirmation
 - VOMS SAML service can be extended to support this profile by providing 'SAML Token profile' compliant SAML Token

AC Certificates in Extension



SAML Assertion in SOAP Header




Combination of Both



- PGI mandates to use at least one of the AUTHZ plumbings should be used
- But in principle we can apply both together
- So using jointly the plumbing PGI_AUTHZ_ACCERTEXT together with PGI_AUTHZ_SAML

Common Attributes




Common Attributes



- TBD

Common Constraints/Restrictions




Common Constraints/Restrictions



- TBD


Out of Scope



Out of Scope

- Standardization on profiles that retrieve attributes from Attribute Authorities (Aas)
 - How end-users obtain their attributes is out of scope of PGI
- Specific policy technologies and definitions
 - How specific policies, (e.g. XACML policies) are defined is out of scope of PGI
- Usage policy of production infrastructures
 - The policy of how and if end-users can use cross-Grid resources is out of scope of PGI

Conclusions




Conclusions



- We basically more or less survey what security setups is used in production Grids currently
 - We thus not define a large security framework
 - We focus on elements used in production already or (very soon in production)
- The main achievements in our group is agreement about certain important elements / standards
 - E.g. BES, SRM, GridFTP, GLUE, ...
 - Work on missing links between them
 - Work on tunings / refinements /re-alignments of them

Discussions



Discussions



- TBD

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